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I. INTRODUCTION
Markets have limits. It is exceedingly rare today to find a market without
them. Moreover, this fact-standing alone-is uncontroversial. Even the most
ardent free market advocates concede that limitations on some markets may be either
inevitable, due to the nature of the item or activity in question, or desirable, due, for
example, to a need to control externalities or correct market failures.
Whether moral considerations demand limits on the marketplace, however, is
a different question and is highly contested territory. Scholars from law, philoso-
phy, economics, sociology, and political science, among others, have all waded
* Kathrine Robinson Everett Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law; Senior Fellow,
Kenan Institute for Ethics, Duke University. © 2015, Kimberly D. Krawiec.
1. Some markets are inherently limited because the item or relationship in question cannot be the
subject of a bargained-for exchange without changing its essential character. My offer of a thousand
dollars to be my friend does not render you one, though it may buy me the accouterments of friendship.
Though frequently invoked as evidence of the limitations on or corrupting force of markets, this is
actually just a statement about the nature of friendship. My threats of violence will gain me no greater
success in the endeavor than my offers of money.
2. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUMBIA L. REv. 970, 990 (1985).
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into the debate without generating agreement. As Jason Brennan and Peter
Jaworski noted in their presentation for this symposium, there appears to be a
limitless market for books about the ethical limits of markets. 3
In this essay, I examine a component of that debate that is also addressed by
other symposium contributors-the extent to which market norms are destined
to crowd out nonmarket ideals and conceptions of the person.4 One popular
view adheres to "separate spheres" for market and nonmarket activity. Under
this theory, not only is there a sharp divide between the market and nonmarket
realms, but the market is particularly corrupting of nonmarket ideals and values.
According to this school of thought, the mere language of the marketplace can
damage our conceptions of personhood, even when no literal marketplace exists.
Others, in contrast, point to the regular coexistence of both market and
nonmarket domains, arguing that the marketplace need not crowd out nonmar-
ket ideals. In this essay, I expand on the second of these theories, using the
example of human egg (or oocyte) donation in the United States as an illustra-
tion.5 Although "separate spheres" adherents are quick to argue that market
discourse can undermine nonmarket conceptions of personhood even when no
literal market exists, few pause to consider the alternative-can gift discourse
preserve nonmarket conceptions of personhood even in the presence of a
market? In the egg market, not only do market and nonmarket cultural under-
standings coexist, but powerful cultural understandings of egg donation as an
altruistic gift are essential to the literal market trading of oocytes.
I also explore the effect of these cultural understandings on the social
policies-the policy decisions, legal rules, and market structure-governing egg
donation, through two recent cases of first impression involving the human
oocyte market. The first case, challenging the legality of an "ethical" cap on egg
donor compensation of the type long considered per se illegal in other indus-
tries, is still in litigation. The second case, involving a failure by the IRS to
collect taxes owed on egg donor compensation, in contrast to its treatment of
similar income generating activities, was decided against the taxpayer this year.
I argue that the cultural account of egg donation as gift-based exchange is in
increasing tension with a legal regime (properly) attuned to the realities of egg
donation as a robust industry. Societal unease with the literal egg market is
mediated through the cultural understanding of egg donation as at least partly a
nonmarket gift exchange. This, of course, is far from the market reality of egg
donation, which is a lucrative business for fertility centers and egg agencies, a
substantial source of income for many young women, and one of the most
3. Jason Brennan & Peter M. Jaworski, Comments at the Georgetown Institute for the Study of
Markets and Ethics Symposium: The Ethical Limits of Markets (Nov. 21, 2014).
4. See, e.g., Kendy M. Hess, Metaphors Matter: Ethics and the Meme of the Market, 13 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. PoL'Y 321, 331-35 (2015).
5. I follow the common terminology for the provision of eggs (and, later, sperm) as "donation" by
"donors," despite the fact that both egg and sperm providers in the United States are financially
compensated.
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important purchases that consumers (intended parents) will ever make. Society
has a certain set of concerns regarding all markets, which are expressed through
the legal regime. That regime aims, among other things, to control collusive
economic activity and rationally tax income generating activities.
The fact that egg market practices so inconsistent with these traditional
concerns of market regulation persisted unchallenged for so long is itself
striking evidence of the cultural view of egg donation as somehow different
from other markets. Only time will tell whether that cultural view will survive
social policies that, as highlighted by the two cases discussed in this essay, are
increasingly attuned to egg donation's status as a market activity.
II. PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE OR SEPARATE SPHERES?
In the traditional view of the proper role of markets, most human interactions
are reducible to the marketplace, with a few special exceptions, such as close
familial interactions, bodily integrity, and the relation of a person to her
government, to name just a few.6 This division of the world into a pure market
domain and a pure nonmarket domain has held considerable sway with students
of markets over the years and continues to do so today. Sometimes referred to as
"separate spheres" theory after one of its leading proponents, Michael Walzer,
this view contends not only that the market and nonmarket realms should
remain separate, but that society must constantly guard against the market
overstepping its bounds, lest it corrupt other areas of life.7
Margaret Jane Radin, labeling this line of thinking "domino theory," summed
it up as follows:
The domino theory holds that there is a slippery slope leading from toleration
of any sales of something to an exclusive market regime for that thing; and
there is a further slippery slope from a market regime for some things to a
market regime encompassing everything people value. The domino theory implic-
itly makes two claims: first, as a background normative premise, that it is important
for a nonmarket regime to exist; and second, as an empirical premise, that a
nonmarket regime cannot coexist with a market regime. The market drives out the
nonmarket version; hence the market regime must be banned. 8
This "separate spheres" view of the market as a corrupting force is both
influential and persistent, as evidenced by Michael Sandel's recent best-selling
book on the topic9 and the contribution to this symposium by Kendy Hess.1 o
6. MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 30-45 (1996) (discussing the concept of "the
market domain" in traditional, liberal thought and providing examples).
7. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983).
8. RADIN, supra note 6, at 99-100.
9. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN'T Buy: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS (2012).
10. Kendy M. Hess, Metaphors Matter: Ethics and the Meme of the Market, 13 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
Poc'Y 321 (2015).
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To many separate spheres market skeptics, the mere language, symbolism,
and value system of the marketplace is corrupting of nonmarket conceptions of
personhood, even if no literal marketplace exists.1 1 According to this view,
conceiving of human organs, babies, or sexual relations in market terms-
conceiving of them as "sales" or "purchases" for a "price," for example-as is
common among some law and economics scholars, degrades our conception of
organs, babies, and sex, even in the absence of literal buying and selling.
12
Variously referred to as "market rhetoric," "market discourse," and "market
memes," the relevant point is that this concept describes a cultural understand-
ing of the nature of certain relationships, items, and activities and their role in
the marketplace that is, in fact, independent of any literal marketplace or buying
or selling activity.
In her now famous analysis of "contested commodities," Margaret Jane
Radin criticized separate spheres thinking, arguing that it conceded too much
power to the "universal commodification" worldview held by scholars such as
Gary Becker and Richard Posner. 13 Though she attacked universal commodifica-
tion as detrimental to human flourishing, she also challenged the separate
spheres worldview, championing instead a middle ground in which market
understandings of items, activities, and relationships could coexist with nonmar-
ket understandings. 14 In other words, a thing can be both priceless and bought
and sold for a price, at the same time. It could be, in other words, "incompletely
commodified."
Consistent with market critics who view the mere language and symbolism of
the marketplace as corrupting, Radin attached great importance to the cultural
understandings of items and activities as independent from whether market
trading actually occurred. The cultural understanding of an activity might be
incompletely commodified, for example, when some people accept a commodi-
fled, or market, understanding while others reject it. Though some economists
may conceive of babies as commodities traded in metaphorical markets, for
example, most people do not.
Alternatively, the same person may hold both market and nonmarket concep-
tions of the same item or activity. I may, for example, adhere to a commodified
understanding of housework in some settings (my housekeeper) but not in
others (the division of labor among spouses). Finally, I may hold multiple
simultaneous conceptions of an item or activity, such as performing lifesaving
surgery both because it earns money and because it helps others.1 5 As will be
11. RADIN, supra note 6, at 86-88; Hess, supra note 10, at 331.
12. See generally, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1991); Elisabeth M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, The Economics of The Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUDIES 323 (1978).
13. RADIN, supra note 6, at 2-6, 103. Universal commodification treats all items and activities,
including familial relations, bodily integrity, and the rights and responsibilities of citizens in a
democratic state, as commodities to be bought and sold. Id. at 2.
14. RADIN, supra note 6, at 102.
15. CECILE FABRE, WHOSE BODY IS IT ANYWAY? (2006).
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shown in Part III, human egg donation in the United States is a prime example
of this type of incompletely commodified cultural understanding in which both
market and nonmarket memes are simultaneously at work.
In addition to these cultural understandings of markets and their limits, there
are, of course, literal markets, and these too may be completely commodified
(laissez faire trading), incompletely commodified (some restrictions on trading),
or not commodified at all (a ban on trading). Just as Radin rejected the separate
spheres vision of market memes and values as destined to crowd out nonmarket
cultural understandings, she similarly embraced a middle ground of literal
markets. According to Radin, social policy-the policy decisions, legal rules,
and actual market structure generated by our cultural understandings of markets
and their proper limits-could create literal markets that were nonetheless
designed to protect nonmarket values important to human flourishing and our
conception of personhood. 
16
This assertion has been controversial. Critics, for example, have argued that
Radin provides no principled method by which to distinguish acceptable social
policies that promote personhood from unacceptable ones. 17 Still others contend
that the market limits she defends as promoting personhood could just as easily
pass muster under standard economic analysis or utilitarian theories.18
Part IV of this essay explores two cases of first impression in the United
States to illustrate the social policy governing human egg donation. As will be
shown, although market participants may successfully navigate the cultural
understanding of egg donation as both a priceless gift and a market exchange
for value, social policy-in this case, designed to prevent market collusion and
facilitate the rational taxation of income generating activities-often finds that
accommodation more difficult.
III. CULTURAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF GAMETE MARKETS
Although market critics are quick to argue that market discourse can under-
mine nonmarket conceptions of personhood even when no literal market exists,
few pause to consider the alternative-can gift discourse preserve nonmarket
conceptions of personhood in the presence of literal market trading? At the very
least, I will argue, gift discourse provides sufficient cultural acceptance of a
contested commodity-in this case human eggs-to facilitate operation of the
literal marketplace.
This section compares cultural understandings of the egg and sperm markets,
each of which enjoys a robust commercial market in the United States. As will
be shown, cultural understandings of these two literal markets are very differ-
ent. Contrary to popular belief, the U.S. has never been comfortable with a
16. RADIN, supra note 6, at 102-114.
17. See generally, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Invaluable Goods, 35 J. EcON. LiT. 757 (1997).
18. Id.; see also Timothy J. Brenna, Rights, Market Failure, and Rent Control: A Comment on
Radin, 17 PHI. & PUB. AiE. 66 (1988).
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complete commodification of egg donation, which sits uncomfortably in a
middle ground between gift and market exchange. Egg donation's incompletely
commodified status stands in stark contrast to cultural understandings of the
sperm market as fully commodified (one might argue, hyper-commodified).
Both examples, however, illustrate the ways in which cultural understandings
about the proper limits of markets shape the conceptions, language, and interac-
tions of market participants.
A. The Egg Market: Giving the Gift of Life
The United States is unusual among most jurisdictions in that it permits a
legal market in human eggs. This is a source of dismay for many market critics,
who contend that human eggs are traded in the United States just like any other
commodity.19 This is far from true, however. Instead, the United States exhibits
simultaneous and often conflicting conceptions of egg donation as both a
commodity subject to market forces and a selfless act of charity that is not-and
should not be-fully reducible to the marketplace. In other words, egg donation
is incompletely commodified, as Radin and other scholars have defined that
term. This incomplete commodification is both a matter of cultural understand-
ing and, as detailed in Part IV, a matter of social policy.
On the one hand, egg markets in the United States are big business. In 2012,
the most recent year for which comprehensive data are available, donor eggs or
embryos were used in 19,847 artificial reproductive technology (ART) cycles,
most of them involving women over forty. 20 This represents a nearly forty
percent increase over 2003.21 Unlike many other countries, which have banned
payments to egg donors, every US state but Louisiana permits payment in
exchange for human egg donation.22 As will be discussed in part IV, these
payments are a source (sometimes, a significant source) of supplemental income
for thousands of young women.
At the same time, however, the United States exhibits a distinct unease with a
complete commodification of egg donation, embracing instead an apparent
middle ground possessing elements of both gift and market exchange. Egg
donor advertising and recruiting materials reflect this compromise, exhorting
donors to "give the gift of life," while offering handsome payment for their
19. Mary Lyndon Shanley, Collaboration and Commodification in Assisted Procreation: Reflections
on an Open Market and Anonymous Donation in Human Sperm and Eggs, 36 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 257
(2002); Shan Li, Asian Women Command Premium Prices For Egg Donation, Los ANGELES TIMES (May
4, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/04/business/la-fi-egg-donation-20120504.
20. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT
44 (2012).
21. Id. at51.
22. Many state laws, as well as the ethical rules of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine,
prohibit payment for the eggs themselves but allow compensation based on time, inconvenience, and
discomfort.
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services.23 Egg donors themselves appear to embrace this middle territory,
citing both altruistic and profit motives for their decision to become egg
donors. 24 As compared to sperm donors, for example, egg donors are less likely
to conceive of egg donation as "employment" or a "job" and are more likely to
emphasize the ability to help the infertile achieve parenthood, while still
acknowledging the motivating force of money.
25
Fertility-center and donor agency staff reinforce these notions through screen-
ing practices and interactions with both donors and recipients. Potential egg
donors who claim monetary compensation as their overriding motivation, for
example, are often eliminated as undesirable. Some staff even express disgust
and revulsion toward egg donors just in it "for the money" or who "attempt to make a
career" out of egg donation. Staff interactions with egg donors emphasize the satisfac-
tion achievable by helping others realize their dreams of parenthood, while egg
recipients are encouraged to send thank you notes, or even gifts.
26
Not surprisingly, perhaps, these sentiments map onto perceived customer
preferences. There is a widespread belief that fertility customers do not want
egg donors who reveal overtly monetary motivations for the desire to donate.
Accordingly, donor agency staff spend time coaching egg donors, but not sperm
donors, on how to appropriately package their personalities and their reasons for
wanting to become a donor. That package includes a desire to help those who
23. A recent Craigslist ad demonstrated the point well: "Earn Thousands! Egg Donors needed
immediately! (Atlanta Perimeter area). The gift you make through egg donation is priceless-and your
time is worth up to $8,000!" Craigslist, post id: 4695968191 (last visited, Oct. 30, 2014). For a more
detailed discussion of egg donor advertising and recruiting see, Kimberly D. Krawiec, Sunny Samaritans and
Egomaniacs: Price-Fixing In the Gamete Market, 72 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 59 (2009).
24. Some donors report primarily altruistic motives, some report primarily profit motives, and others
report a mixture of both. Satvinder Purewal & O.B.A. van den Akker, Systematic review of oocyte
donation: investigating attitudes, motivations and experiences, 15 HUMAN REPRODUCTION UPDATE 499
(2009). Many of these studies, however, rely on donor's self-reported motivations during the psychologi-
cal screening of prospective egg donors, and thus may overstate donor's altruistic motivations. Id.
25. RENE ALMELING, SEX CELLS: THE MEDICAL MARKET FOR EGGS AND SPERM 125-140, (2011).
26. Id. at 74-83. The websites of many fertility clinics are instructive. Says one, for example:
There are many reasons why a woman may choose to donate her eggs. Altruism is usually a
motivating factor, as these women sincerely want to help other women conceive a child. ...
Apart from altruism, financial gain is sometimes a motive as donors are compensated for their
efforts.
Donor Egg IVF Program, WASHINGTON CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE, http://www.seattleivf.com/
egg-donors.html (last visited May 5, 2015).
Another website states:
Are EFS egg donors motivated strictly by money? Absolutely not! In fact, we've found that
candidates who are only motivated for financial reasons tend not to be as fully committed to
the program, and ultimately are not acceptable donors. Though financial compensation is
certainly important to most donors and their families, EFS donors truly enjoy helping others.
This is an integral part of their altruistic nature and is a strong contributing factor in their
decision to participate in our donor program. These young women see their involvement as a
unique opportunity to give a remarkable gift to a couple seeking to experience the joy of
becoming a family.
FAQs, ELITE FERTILITY SOLUTIONS, http://www.elitefertility.com/faqs/ (last visited May 5, 2015).
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are infertile and downplays (but doesn't eliminate) profit motivations.27
B. The Sperm Market: Just Another Day at the Office
In contrast to the egg market, the sperm market has generated comparatively
little controversy in the United States. This is not to suggest that Americans
evince no unease with the sperm market-to the contrary, they do.28 But, unlike
the egg market, that unease does not stem from the fact of literal market trading.
In contrast to egg donation, cultural understandings of sperm donation empha-
size the market aspects of sperm donation while downplaying any similarities to
gift giving or charity. While the gift meme is not entirely absent-sperm
donation is still referred to as a donation, after all-its limited influence stands
in stark contrast to the prior description of the egg market.
Unlike the egg market, where societal discomfort revolves expressly around
commodification concerns, the historical discomfort with sperm markets arose
from a different set of issues. Specifically, critics-most notably the church-
opposed sperm donation on the grounds that it required masturbation and
resulted in the birth of an illegitimate child.29 Although such views are thank-
fully a relic of the (fairly recent) past, there remains a lingering uneasiness with
sperm donation and a potential distrust of donor motivations.30 That distrust
seems to involve at least some fear that the same altruistic motives valued in
egg donors may form a shield for sperm donors seeking to fulfill egoistic
evolutionary desires to produce genetic offspring.31 In contrast to the language
27. ALMELING, supra note 25, at 74-83.
28. Historically, sperm donation was associated with deviant behavior, and there remains even today
a lingering "yuk" factor. See, e.g., Erica Haimes, Issues of Gender in Gamete Donation, 36 Soc. Sci.
MED. 85, 87-90 (1993).
29. See, e.g., id. at 87 (reporting that the Archbishop of Canterbury's Commission in 1948 urged the
criminalization of sperm donation because the process requires masturbation and results in the birth of
an illegitimate child); John McMillan, The Return of the Inseminator: Eutelegenesis in Past and
Contemporary Reproductive Ethics, 38 STUD. HIST. PHILOS. BIOL. BIOMED. Sci. 393 (2007) (calling the
1948 report's position that artificial insemination amounts to adultery as "verging on the bizarre" and
discussing other religious objections to artificial insemination).
30. For example, members of the Warnock Committee (established by the British government to
study and make recommendations on issues of human fertilization and embryology, and which led to
the British Human Fertilization and Embryology Act of 1990) reported unspecified feelings by the
committee of "yuk" and "instinctive dislike" of sperm donation, which they nonetheless recommended
be approved. Haimes, supra note 2228, at 89-90.
31. See, e.g., Haimes, supra note 28, at 87 (discussing the concern of the Archbishop of Canter-
bury's Commission that sperm donors might invoke "altruistic idealism" to disguise what was actually
"spiritual pride" in their greater virility and ability to propagate); Scoop A. Wasserstein, Shopping For
Sperm: Nobel Prizes Wanted, HARV. CRIMSON, July 22, 2005 (quoting David Plotz, author of The Genius
Factory, as stating that the key attraction of sperm donation to most young men is "making money for
something you do anyway," and that, although some men claim altruistic motives, many of them are
really egomaniacs); see also Free Fertility Found. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, Docket No.
17122-07X (Filed July 7, 2010) (refusing to grant tax exempt status to a non-profit sperm bank which
supplied sperm from one donor free of charge to women meeting certain criteria because "Simply put,
petitioner's activities may promote the propagation of Naylor's seed and population growth, but they do
not promote health for the benefit of the community.").
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of gift and the focus on altruism and charity that characterizes the egg market,
the commodified and market-driven nature of sperm donation provides a plau-
sible, self-interested motivation with which consumers, fertility professionals,
and donors appear more at ease.
This cultural understanding of sperm donation as a market transaction is
reflected in sperm donor advertisements that ask, "Why not get paid for it?" and
advertise, "your sperm can earn!",32 Sperm bank personnel seem to go out of
their way to reinforce the notion of sperm donation as just another job. Clinic
staff, for example, downplay (or avoid altogether) the fact that genetic offspring
will emerge from this "job." There are no thank you notes or gifts. 3 3
This cultural understanding of sperm donation as a fully commodified market
transaction resonates with the views expressed by sperm donors themselves. In
interviews, sperm donors repeatedly refer to sperm donation as "just another
job," "the easiest job," and "just something to make money.",34 Fertility profes-
sionals express similar sentiments, contrasting sperm donors' monetary motiva-
tions with the altruism so valued in egg donors.35
This interview (one of many) by sociologist Rene Almeling with a prominent
fertility specialist and twenty-year medical director of a large fertility clinic
sums up the different understandings of these two markets well:
Physician: I like to see some altruism of the [egg] donors. Yes, we pay
them $2,000, and that's probably the low end of what donors are getting paid
around the nation, but in [this small college town] it's not an insignificant
amount of money. When we ask them "Why do you want to be a donor?"
most say, "Well I saw this [news] program on TV, or I've got a cousin that's
going through infertility, or I want to help people." Most of them, it's about
some reason other than I saw an ad in the newspaper, and I want to make
some money...
Rene: What is it about altruism that's important?
Physician: It just tells me that they're less likely to have regrets down the
road, that they've really approached this as "I want to help somebody," not
"I'm doing this to make money."
Rene: And then a similar question for sperm donors. What would make you
think this is a great donor?
Physician: The sperm donors were different .... Sperm donors, in general,
weren't as altruistic. They honestly were guys that wanted to make money,
and guys have less attachment to their sperm than women do of their eggs.
Very few sperm donors actually ever have regrets about, you know, "What did
36I do?" So, men were a little different than the women.
32. Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Woman's Worth, 88 N.C. L. REv. 1739, 1761 (2010).
33. ALMELING, supra note 25, at 131-33.
34. Id. at 81, 131-33.
35. Id.
36. ALMELING, supra note 25, at 81.
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IV. SOCIAL POLICY AND THE EGG MARKET
As this account has emphasized, market and nonmarket cultural understand-
ings not only coexist in the egg market, but powerful cultural understandings of
gift exchange actually facilitate literal trading in human eggs by reframing
otherwise uncomfortable activity as a more familiar and palatable transaction.
Recall, however, that cultural understandings shape social policy-that is, the
laws, rules, and organizational structure that govern the literal marketplace-
and vice versa. Does social policy manage to finesse egg donation's incom-
pletely commodified status as neither fully gift nor market transaction but,
instead, a little bit of both?
So far it has not. As demonstrated in Part III, societal unease with the literal
egg market is mediated through cultural understandings of egg donation of at
least partly a nonmarket gift exchange. This, of course, is far from the market
reality of egg donation, which is a lucrative business for fertility centers and egg
agencies, a substantial source of income for many young women, and one of the
most important purchases that consumers (intended parents) will ever make.
Society has a certain set of concerns regarding all markets, which are expressed
through the legal regime. That regime aims, among other things, to control
collusive economic activity and rationally tax income generating activities. As
will be shown in this section, these policies are in direct tension with the
cultural understanding of egg donation as a charitable gift.
A. Kamakahi v. American Society for Reproductive Medicine
1. Background
The tension between the cultural understanding of egg donation as incom-
pletely commodified and the reality of egg donation as a thriving market sector
is typified by a recent class action brought by Lindsay Kamakahi and Justine
Levy on behalf of themselves and other egg donors against the American
Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) and the Society for Assisted
Reproductive Technology (SART).37 The suit challenges the ASRM-SART
guidelines on the ethical compensation of egg donors, which limit payments to
egg donors to $5,000 ($10,000 under special circumstances), as an illegal
price-fixing agreement in violation of United States antitrust laws. These laws
prohibit business practices that unreasonably restrict competition and result in
higher consumer prices for products and services. In March 2013, the court
denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the case, thus paving the way for the
litigation to proceed.38 On February 3, 2015, the judge certified the class,
37. Lindsay Kamakahi v. American Soc'y for Reproductive Med., Consolidated Amended Class
Action Compl., No. 3:11 -CV- 1781 U. S. Dist. Ct. (N.D. Cal. April 12, 2012).
38. Lindsay Kamakahi v. American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Order Denying Mot. To
Dismiss, No. 3:11-CV-1781 U. S. Dist. Ct. (N.D. Cal. March 29, 2013).
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removing the final hurdle to litigation.39
The challenged ASRM-SART guidelines first appeared in 2000, in the wake
of increasing public attention and controversy regarding rising rates of egg-
donor compensation. 40 As already noted, the cultural understanding of sperm
donation is that of a market transaction much like any other. Social policy and
market structure reflect that understanding-as with other jobs, sperm donors
are paid whatever the market will bear. Their wages are not controlled through
ethical guidelines or price caps of any sort.
ASRM employed these market-determined rates of sperm donor compensa-
tion to set the maximum prices to be paid to egg donors, despite the differences
between the two procedures in terms of time, risk, and discomfort. Using the
2000 average hourly sperm donor rate of between $60 and $75 as a baseline,
and multiplying that by the fifty-six hours that the average egg donor spends in
a medical setting per donation cycle, ASRM concluded that, if egg donors were
to be paid the same hourly rate as sperm donors, they should receive between
$3,360 and $4,200 per egg-donation cycle. Recognizing that egg donation
involves a greater time commitment, risk, and discomfort than sperm donation,
however, ASRM concluded that egg donors deserve higher amounts. The report
concluded that "although there is no consensus on the precise payment that
oocyte donors should receive, at this time sums of $5000 or more require
justification and sums above $10,000 go beyond what is appropriate." 41 ASRM
did not elaborate further on how it arrived at these amounts or why the chosen
premium over sperm donor rates represented fair compensation for the in-
creased risks and discomforts egg donors face. In 2007, ASRM issued new
guidelines that restated these amounts and rationales and the amounts have not
been increased since that time.42
SART represents over 90% of Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART)
clinics in the United States and sets guidelines for best practices in the field of
ART as a requirement of membership.43 Among those requirements are the
guidelines on the ethical compensation of egg donors promulgated by ASRM.
Thus, more than 90% of ART clinics in the United States have entered into
agreements to cap egg donor compensation at the ASRM-determined rates.
39. Lindsay Kamakahi v. American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Order Regarding Motions
To Exclude Expert Opinions And Motion For Class Certification, No. 3:11-CV-1781 U. S. Dist. Ct.
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2015). The judge certified the class only on the issue of whether the price caps
violate the Sherman Act, and not on the issue of damages. Id.
40. Informal efforts, centered in particular geographic areas, predate this.
41. Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Financial Incentives in
Recruitment of Oocyte Donors, 82 FERTILITY & STERILITY 240 (2004).
42. Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, 'Financial Compensation
of Oocyte Donors,' 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 305 (2007).
43. What is SART, SOCIETY FOR ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, http://sart.org/What is SART/
(last visited May 5, 2015).
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2. The Legal Challenge
The fact that this open and well-publicized price fixing persisted unchal-
lenged for more than a decade is itself striking evidence of the extent to which
egg donation is not viewed as the trade of a simple commodity. An agreement
among competitors to control prices, such as the agreement among SART-
member fertility clinics to follow the ASRM price caps, is referred to in
antitrust law as a "naked price fixing agreement." Such agreements are tradition-
ally presumed illegal for a simple reason-it has long been accepted that such
restraints on competition are injurious to the public, with few or no offsetting
benefits. 44 The traditional rule is that such naked agreements are "per se"
illegal-that is, they are conclusively presumed illegal without inquiry into
whether competition is actually reduced or consumers are actually harmed. This
is true whether the agreement is one to keep output prices high or, like the egg
donor pricing guidelines, to keep input prices low. If egg donation was really
viewed like trade in any other commodity, the compensation guidelines might
well have been challenged long before now.
The reality, as Kamakahi demonstrates, is that even in the United States,
where egg donation is commonly assumed to be subject to the same free market
forces that apply to any other transaction, the cultural understanding of human
egg donation is one of incomplete commodification-a transaction that is
neither fully market nor fully gift, but somewhere in between the two.
I engage this litigation in more depth elsewhere, finding the ASRM-SART
case lacking. Here, however, I merely invoke Kamakahi for two purposes.
First, as a further illustration of egg donation's incompletely commodified
status, and second, as an illustration of the tensions that can arise when we
attempt to cleanly map such incompletely commodified cultural understandings
onto the social policy and market structure of the literal marketplace.
B. Perez v. Commissioner
Though egg donation may straddle the gift-market divide in the minds of
market participants, the tax code allows for no such middle ground. Conse-
quently, it is somewhat astonishing-though perhaps it should not be, given the
prior discussion of the cultural account of egg donation-that until this year
there was no definitive statement on the taxability of egg donor compensation,
despite the nearly 6000 children born from donor eggs in the United States each
44. Per se agreements are "agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompeti-
tive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality-they are 'illegal per
se.' Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). Naked price-fixing is one
of the few fact patterns easily characterized as a per se violation of the Sherman Act because "naked
price fixing rarely or never has anything to be said in its support." HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 3 FEDERAL
ANTITRUST POLICY 256 (3d ed. 2005).
45. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Egg-Donor Price Fixing and Kamakahi v. American Society for Reproduc-
tive Medicine, 16 VIRTUAL MENTOR: AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION JOURNAL OF ETHICS 57 (2014).
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year.46 Should egg donors be taxed on the proceeds received from egg dona-
tion? If not, then what do the payments represent? If donors are to be taxed,
then what type of income is it: income from the sale of assets (the eggs) or
income from the provision of a service? Yet, Perez v. Commissioner, decided in
January of 2015, is the first case to address the taxability of the proceeds from
egg donation.4 7
1. No Income: Just Pain and Suffering
On two separate occasions in 2009, Nichelle G. Perez agreed to provide
oocytes to an anonymous couple through The Donor Source, a California-based
egg donor agency.48 Perez received $10,000 on each occasion and was issued a
1099 in the amount of $20,000. Perez did not include this $20,000 on her
federal income tax return in 2009, instead listing only the roughly $43,000 she
earned that year at her full-time job. Perez claims that, because the payments from the
Donor Source represent compensation for "pain and suffering," they are not includ-
able in taxable income. The IRS disagreed, seeking back taxes and penalties.
According to the trial transcript, Perez has been an egg donor through The
Donor Source a total of five times, once in 2007, twice in 2008, and twice in
2009. Interestingly, in 2008 Perez received a notice from the IRS that she would
be taxed on her income earned as an egg donor but, following advice from other
egg donors found on the Internet, contested the notice with the IRS, who then
dropped the matter:
Q: What happened? What did you do?
A: I pretty much took the advice that I found online from other donors,
what they had done, what they had said, stating that the income was from pain
and suffering, and sent the page of the contract that stated that. And their case
was dismissed and I received a similar letter, and that was the end of it for
2008. (emphasis added)
Far from being an isolated incident, Perez's account matches that of other egg
donors. For example, one eight-time egg donor gives advice at weareeggdo-
nors.com about how to appeal taxes owed on egg donation income. 49 "Eliza-
beth" advises egg donors to:
46. For the number of births from donated eggs see, Clinic Summary Report for 2012, SOCIETY FOR
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, https://www.sartcorsonline.com/rptCSR PublicMultYear.aspx?
ClinicPKID -0 (last visited May 5, 2015).
47. Perez v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, No. 9103-12 (T.C. Jan. 22, 2015). Even now, questions
remain regarding whether proceeds earned from egg donation are a sale of assets or income earned
from the provision of a service. The Perez court declined to address the issue, as both parties stipulated
that the proceeds were in exchange for the provision of a service. Id.
48. Id. All facts regarding the case and background events are taken from the trial transcript and
related filings.
49. Raquel, How a High-demand 8x Egg Donor Appealed her Taxes and Won-Part 2, WE ARE EGG
DONORS (Aug. 7, 2103), http://weareeggdonors.com/2013/08/07/part-two/.
2015]
362 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY
Be proactive with the IRS! If you have 1099 income that you think should
be excluded from tax take the steps to draft a comprehensive appeal for
reconsideration....
Make sure that your contract clearly outlines the facts that you are being
compensated for physical injury, in consideration of future medical complica-
tions, and emotional suffering in addition to any economic losses endured.
Elizabeth even provides a sample letter to the IRS for use by other egg
donors. After detailing the "pain and suffering" endured in order to provide eggs
for the benefit of a commissioning couple, the letter concludes:
In the United States of America it is illegal to pay for or sell genetic material
thus donors are not paid for eggs; we are compensated for various damages
including but not limited to physical injury. This is quite different from being
employed or contracted for work. Egg donation is not a job or the sale of
goods. From the irs.gov site it is stated that: in 1996, IRC § 104 (a)(2) was
amended to exclude gross income [sic] "the amount of any damages ... re-
ceived whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic
payments in account of physical injuries or physical sickness." This indeed is
a case of compensation on account of both of those variables.
Comments on the site from other egg donors suggest that others are following
this technique. Pending cases make clear both that other egg donors followed
this procedure with success and that the IRS is now initiating proceedings to
collect back taxes and penalties from some egg donors.5 0
2. Cultural Understandings and Legal Realities
In a ruling that surprised few in the tax community, the court held that egg
donor compensation is taxable income and rejected the "pain and suffering"
claim, distinguishing the type of voluntary, contractual exchange entered into by
egg donors from the involuntary tort damages to which § 104(a)(2) was
intended to apply.51 To rule otherwise would mean, for example, that profes-
sional athletes, such as boxers, are not taxable on their earnings, because they
suffer injuries in the course of performing their contractual obligations.
Yet "pain and suffering" is precisely the grounds on which the IRS allowed
Perez and other egg donors to avoid taxes for several years. One can only
speculate about why the IRS so readily accepted such a weak argument. Perhaps
the answer is merely ignorance about the mechanics of egg donation. Perhaps
50. Personal communication with Kirby Mitchell (May 8, 2014).
51. Perez, supra note 47. For the views of various tax experts on the case see, Kim Krawiec, Taxing
Eggs: A Mini-Symposium, THE FACULTY LOUNGE (Feb. 23 2014), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2014/0
2/taxing-eggs-a-mini-symposium.html. For treatments of the taxation question that pre-date Perez, see
Lisa Milot, What are We-Laborers, Factories, or Spare Parts-The Tax Treatment of Transfers of Human
Body Materials, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1053 (2010); Bridget J. Crawford, Our Bodies, Our (Tax)
Selves, 31 VA. TAX REV. 695 (2011).
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IRS agents have been conditioned by the language and sentiments surrounding
egg "donation," into concluding that egg donors derive no real benefit in
exchange for their "gift." Or, perhaps it was simply a matter of administrative
convenience-the cost of collection efforts may have exceeded what the IRS
assumed would be relatively small revenues from a few isolated, one-time
transactions. As the Perez case and Elizabeth's discussion above illustrate,
however, donation is not an isolated one-time transaction for many egg donors
and, instead, might well qualify as a trade or business (with resulting tax
implications) for frequent donors such as Perez and Elizabeth. 2
Particularly relevant, given the discussion in Part III of this essay of the
cultural understanding of egg donation as not "work," in contrast to sperm
donation, are these closing lines from the decision:
We see no limit on the mischief that ruling in Perez's favor might cause: A
professional boxer could argue that some part of the payments he received for
his latest fight is excludable because they are payments for his bruises, cuts,
and nosebleeds. A hockey player could argue that a portion of his million-
dollar salary is allocable to the chipped teeth he invariably suffers during his
career. And the same would go for the brain injuries suffered by football
players and the less-noticed bodily damage daily endured by working men
and women on farms and ranches, in mines, or on fishing boats. We don't
doubt that some portion of the compensation paid all these people reflects the
risk that they will feel pain and suffering, but it's a risk of pain and suffering
that they agree to before they begin their work. And that makes it taxable
compensation and not excludable damages.
Egg donation might be a pseudo-charitable gift, lurking somewhere in the
middle ground between gift and market in the eyes of market participants. But
in the eyes of the court, it is just another (risky) job.
Will Perez alter the cultural account of egg donation as a priceless gift? My
own intuition is that it will not. The tax classification of any activity may
diverge substantially from our shared mental categorization of that transac-
tion-it is possible to have a cultural understanding of egg donation as incom-
pletely commodified while taxing the proceeds from donation like any other
income. Moreover, at least some egg donors presumably already considered
proceeds earned from egg donation taxable as income. Surely many egg donors,
upon receiving 1099s, simply complied and included egg donation proceeds in
their taxable income without appealing to the IRS.53 Nonetheless, there is
undoubtedly some tension between the cultural account of egg donation as
52. Lisa Milot, Taxing Eggs: Lisa Milot, THE FACULTY LOUNGE (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.
thefacultylounge.org/2014/02/taxing-eggs-lisa-milot.html.
53. At least some agencies fail to issue 1099s, however, with no indication that the IRS has ever
sought to enforce filings. ALMELING, supra note 25, at 77.
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incompletely commodified and the tax account of egg donation as ordinary
income.
V. CONCLUSION: MAKING MARKETS IN HUMAN EGGS
Students of markets from all disciplines are increasingly turning their atten-
tion to the cultural and psychological factors that affect market structure. In
traditionally taboo markets, of which reproduction surely is one, those factors
include cultural understandings of the moral limits of markets and our collective
level of comfort with fully commodifying and subjecting traditionally sacred
items and activities to the marketplace.
Facilitating a market in gametes is no easy task. Donors must relinquish
something with not only a market value, but a personal value as well-their
reproductive capacity. Successful donors will have genetic offspring (perhaps
many of them) whom they will never meet and about whom they will know
nothing. For their part, consumers of gametes-parents-are purchasing a
priceless asset-the genetic makeup of their future child.
Reproductive markets, moreover, are further complicated by deeply ingrained
and rarely consciously-acknowledged conceptions of appropriate gender roles
in the marketplace and in parenthood. Egg donation generates additional queasi-
ness because the process presents some health risks and involves a violation of
bodily integrity sufficiently similar to the violations associated with taboo trades
such as organ donation and paid medical research.
Cultural understandings of the marketplace and the motives and values of
participants within it thus interact with other cultural norms and beliefs-gender
stereotypes, conceptions of parenthood, and qualms regarding violations of the
body-to shape, reframe, and normalize otherwise uncomfortable aspects of
egg and sperm markets. In doing so, those understandings not only help market
participants make cultural sense of the market (by likening it to already familiar
transactions) but also facilitate and enable literal trading in gametes.
The cultural understanding of egg donation reconceptualizes socially uncom-
fortable behavior (the sale of motherhood, the violation of the body for pay) as a
more palatable and familiar transaction-a loving gift that enables those yearn-
ing for a child to achieve their dreams. The fact that few women are willing to
make the gift in the absence of substantial compensation is of little relevance-
market participants understand egg donation as both a gift whose true value
could never be fully compensated and an act deserving of remuneration.
While it is easy to dismiss these cultural understandings as romantic, silly, or
delusional, this severely underestimates their importance, not just to society, but
to the market itself. By reframing traditionally unacceptable behavior as a more
palatable and familiar transaction, society is able to accept a market that is
otherwise socially problematic or even repulsive.54 Market architects ignore
54. Alvin E. Roth, Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets, 21 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 37 (2007).
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these cultural understandings-and, in particular, societal conceptions of the
ethical limits of markets-at their peril. In a world unwilling to embrace the
sale of female reproductive capacity for merely a price, the "priceless gift" of
egg donation allows a market to flourish that otherwise might stagnate under the
weight of social disapproval.
At the same time, this cultural account is undoubtedly in tension with legal
norms (properly) attuned to the realities of egg donation as a robust industry.
This essay has provided two such examples. The first, an "ethical" cap on egg
donor compensation of the type long considered per se illegal in other indus-
tries, is still in litigation. The second, a failure by the IRS to collect taxes owed
on egg donor compensation, in contrast to its treatment of similar income
generating activities, was only decided this year. The fact that egg market
practices so inconsistent with typical market regulation persisted unchallenged
for so long is itself striking evidence of the perceived specialness of the egg
market. Only time will tell whether the cultural account of egg donation
survives what appears to be an increasing social policy emphasis on egg
donation as a marketplace.
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